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LOYALTY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
THE PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers have become the hard-edged warriors of modernity, displaying 
deep skepticism in the possibility of obtaining practical guidance from their 
publicly declared polestar, “justice.”  “Doing the right thing” is radically 
indeterminate—“it all depends;” the “right thing” may simply reduce to 
whatever can be done to vanquish the enemy in particular battles.  The 
objectives of such battles never seem subject to serious scrutiny.  “The law” in 
this war—the rules of engagement—becomes something infinitely 
manipulable, and the more lawyers are paid, the more manipulable the law 
apparently becomes.  A genuine effort to understand the practical concerns that 
gave rise to particular “rules” and “standards” is deliberately shunned in favor 
of whatever opportunistic meanings may be inserted into the capacious caverns 
of legal rhetoric.  (Concern about statutory purpose is, after all, a highly 
political enterprise, a business carried forward by the other, split-off 
personalities of the legal world—i.e., the “mere” theorists in the academy 
many of whom have chosen to distance themselves from the trenches where 
“real” legal work gets done.)  Lawyers generally do not try earnestly and in 
good faith to conform their actions and advice to fit the trace of purpose that 
might dangle loosely from the crude symbols that constitute such rules and 
standards.  Instead, lawyers seek to understand how the very crudity of those 
symbols can be exploited to avoid obligation and to secure relative advantage.  
In the process, lawyers themselves become “the law,” sustaining practices 
suffused with norms and expectations that, if accompanied with the right sized 
check, a convincing case can be assembled in defense of (nearly) any position.  
Is this description of lawyers plausible?  Is this description fair? Is it “true”?  
Sadly, it is “real” in the consequential sense that it is the way lawyers are 
constituted in popular culture.  Can we assign this public characterization to a 
simple misunderstanding of the lawyer’s role?  Is this a communication 
problem not unlike the problems encountered in trying to provide useful 
 
* Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
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information to the public about real or imagined environmental risks?1  Does 
the “if-they-really-understood-what-lawyers-do-they-would-not-judge-us-so-
harshly” response capture the heart of the bar’s public “identity crisis”? 
The answer, of which one cannot be completely sure, depends not only on 
whether the public properly understands the lawyer’s role, but on two 
additional things: acceptance of the claims of need that lawyers offer to justify 
many practices that would otherwise stand as arbitrary; and respect for the 
values that lawyers embrace in articulating such claims.  Stated more simply, 
the “misunderstood” defense cannot rely on the public’s relative lack of 
technical expertise; it must further show that the means (actual conduct) 
engaged by lawyers are reasonably related to a legitimate social end.  Roles 
are, after all, not self-legitimating; nor can they be legitimated on the part of 
those who use them by resort to claims of special privilege. 
The target of this rather acerbic introduction is two ideas central to lawyer 
identity: independence and confidentiality.  The public does, I believe, 
understand and accept the notion that the primary responsibility of a lawyer is 
to protect her client’s legitimate interests.  But they may doubt whether such 
protection requires the kind of “hired gun” mentality that is sometimes 
encountered among lawyers.  They may see as defensive the bar’s most basic 
mantra: “zealous advocacy.” 
The defense of unrestrained advocacy usually emerges from a set of 
assumptions (or assertions) about the topography of the social landscape.  First, 
despite numerous particular examples to the contrary, a general equilibrium 
obtains in matters legal, ensuring that all positions are competently and 
zealously urged upon authority.  Second, that an appropriate and workable 
amount of “satisficing” of all legitimate interests is accommodated in the 
process.  This is the “economic” view of our legal system and of lawyers’ role 
in it:  if consistently and tirelessly observed by members of the bar, zealous 
advocacy will produce, through some invisible-hand-like mechanism, tolerably 
just social conditions.2  But how can advocates of such a view respond to 
Sissela Bok’s observation that: 
By their nature, such arguments are difficult to prove or disprove.  In part, their 
elusiveness stems from an underlying . . . assumption that someone or some 
process, independent of the discordance among participants, will set 
 
 1. Baruch Fischhoff, Valuation and Risk: Public Values in Risk Research, 545 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75 (1996). 
 2. See generally ABA General Practice Section, Proposed Revisions of Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 1 A.B.A. MATERIALS ON MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
Item 519, at 5 (1982) (for the bar’s expression of this notion); PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, reprinted in 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958).  It is criticized 
by Professor William Simon, who describes this belief as the “ideology of advocacy.”  William 
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, WIS. L. REV. 29, 
34-39 (1978). 
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everything to rights. . . .  According to such . . . assumptions, the system works 
best when individual members act as their role demands without worrying 
about the overall picture.3 
Is faith in some mysterious equilibrating force a sufficient basis for our 
endorsement of the ethics of zealous advocacy?4  The public isn’t buying this 
mysticism, and perhaps we should understand better the why’s of that 
rejection.  Are we merely obstructionists or experts in exploiting legal 
“loopholes” that ordinary, good citizens should choose not acknowledge?  It is 
common to hear complaints that lawyers will employ any means at their 
disposal actively to shape the legal system and its requirements in ways that 
corrupt the public-regarding aspects of law? 
It may be tempting to say that the public simply misunderstands what the 
law requires.  I believe that an answer of this sort, while perhaps true to some 
extent, does not go to the heart of the problem, and in a perverse sort of way, 
validates the public concern.  The public may understand the lawyerly point 
that laws can be interpreted in myriad ways, and thus, many different if not 
completely inconsistent (and sometimes surprising) practices can be described 
as “legal.”  The objection may be, instead, that lawyers seem to lack the 
integrity and good faith to provide interpretations that can reasonably be said 
to affirm a publicly defensible understanding of the purpose of particular laws. 
The perversity of the “public doesn’t understand the law” answer to public 
distrust of lawyers rests on its implicit claim of privilege.  The argument 
suggests that “the law” is something that only lawyers are properly equipped to 
understand.  If lawyers are privileged in this way, the public may be suggesting 
the privilege must be tempered with a responsibility that seeks to affirm the 
public-regarding nature of law; otherwise, lawyers’ understanding of law lacks 
any legitimate claim to be binding.  The public may believe that it is precisely 
this responsibility that lawyers have shunned.  Lawyers’ claims of privilege, as 
a consequence, stand naked as mere power. 
This perception of lawyers is, of course, not a new one.5  Consider Justice 
Brandeis’ remonstrances to the Harvard Ethical Society in 1905: 
 
 3. Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 928-9 (1990). 
 4. See Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 595-
605 (1985). 
 5. See Plato, Theaetetus, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 143, 172-75 (B. Jowett trans., 
1937): 
But the lawyer is always in a hurry. . . .  He has become keen and shrewd; he has learned 
how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and 
unrighteous.  His condition, which has been that of a slave from his youth upward, has 
deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were 
too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of 
youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he 
has practiced deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. 
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 It is true that at the present time the lawyer does not hold as high a position 
with the people as he held seventy-five or indeed fifty years ago; but the reason 
is not lack of opportunity.  It is this: Instead of holding a position of 
independence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the 
excesses of either, lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to 
become adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use 
their powers for the protection of the people. . . . 
The leading lawyers of the United States have been engaged mainly in 
supporting the claims of the corporations; often in endeavoring to evade or 
nullify the extremely crude laws by which legislators sought to regulate the 
power or curb the excesses of corporations. . . .  They have erroneously 
assumed that the rule of ethics to be applied to a lawyer’s advocacy is the same 
where he acts for private interests against the public, as it is in litigation 
between private individuals.6 
Implicit in Brandeis’ remarks is the assumption that lawyerly 
responsibilities are heterogeneous.  He suggests that there may be ethical 
constraints on lawyers who practice in areas of public law that do not apply to 
lawyers whose fundamental role can fit within the kind of paradigm of the 
criminal defense attorney.  Brandeis’ remarks have resurfaced in recent legal 
debates.7  Importantly, concerns not unlike those expressed by Justice Brandeis 
have also been raised about the practice of environmental law.  In fact, over the 
past few years, commentary makes the point that environmental practice is 
quite unlike areas of practice in which the unrestrained advocacy model seems 
appropriate and, accordingly, different ethical considerations and perhaps state 
regulation ought to be considered.  Thus, in a 1994 issue of the Harvard Law 
Review, it was argued that the practice of environmental law is a likely target 
 
 6. LOUIS BRANDEIS, THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAW, IN BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 313, 
321-23 (1914) quoted in Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2-
3 (1988).  Justice Brandeis’ concerns find more recent expression in the remarks of former 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Harold Williams: 
There is . . . a disturbing trend among some corporate lawyers . . . to see themselves as 
value-neutral technicians.  True, ethical dilemmas can be avoided if one’s job is viewed as 
profit-maximizing or as uncritically representing—and not questioning or influencing—
the corporate client’s interests so long as they are not illegal.  In many ways, eliminating 
these tensions and professional responsibilities would be a comfortable and less 
contentious alternative.  But indifference to broader considerations would not be 
professional. . . .  To correct this tendency, the bar must place greater emphasis on the 
lawyer’s role as an independent professional—particularly, on his responsibility to uphold 
the integrity of his profession. 
Harold M. Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 BUS. LAW. 165-66 (1980) 
quoted in Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988). 
 7. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning of 
the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1993). 
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for state regulation, mirroring attempts to regulate the securities bar.  Two 
reasons were offered in support of this claim: 
First, compliance with environmental law implicates the classic “moral 
hazard” problem that arises when decision makers do not bear the full costs of 
their actions.  As in the banking and securities context, the public often bears 
most of the cost of an environmental violation.  Federal agency regulation of 
lawyers could decrease the likelihood of environmental disasters by 
encouraging lawyers to counsel strict compliance with environmental laws and 
to cooperate with regulators. 
  Second, environmental law . . . is among the most sophisticated areas of 
legal practice.  Compliance with technical requirements of environmental law 
typically requires the advice of counsel.  In preparing documents for their 
clients to submit to federal regulators, lawyers play a crucial role in the 
interaction between clients and federal regulators.  [E]specially because they 
are situated between clients and their environmental consultant auditors, 
lawyers are likely to possess information about their clients that is difficult and 
costly for federal regulators to obtain independently.  Thus, environmental law 
practice is particularly suited for gatekeeper and whistleblower enforcement 
strategies.8 
Consider also the comments of William Futrell, President of the 
Environmental Law Institute: 
Many aspects of environmental practice may [like securities practice] be . . . 
ill-suited to the adversary model of professional legal ethics, with its creed of 
zealous advocacy with little regard for the public interest or moral norms.  In 
fact, the practice of environmental law demands even stronger regard for the 
public interest than does securities or banking practice.  Environmental statutes 
are motivated by a broad need to protect the public, often from harms that may 
not be immediate but are far-reaching in their ability to disrupt and destroy. . . . 
  Environmental law cannot protect society unless environmental lawyers 
ensure that it does so.  Guidance on how to resolve the conflicting demands of 
client advocacy and protection of the public interest in environmental 
protection will benefit not only the legal profession, but society as a whole.9 
Against the backdrop of these statements and of the apparent public 
distrust (or disgust) with lawyers, it may be useful to ask whether the bar has 
failed in its efforts to provide appropriate and practical ethical guidance for 
those who practice public law generally and environmental law in particular.  
If that question seems a bit too ambitious (and for my purposes here it certainly 
is), we may at least examine some of the more controversial aspects of self 
 
 8. Note, Developments—Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1627 (1994). 
 9. William Futrell, Environmental Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Codes of Professional 
Responsibility, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 825, 837-38 (1994). 
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regulation that might be contributing to the sense that some lawyers are not 
sufficiently regulated or constrained by ethical standards. 
Let me state at the outset that questions concerning the proper scope of self 
regulation, on the one hand, and the desirability of state regulation of legal 
practice, on the other hand, are complex questions informed not only by 
perceptions of the ethical role of the lawyer but by a host of social, economic, 
and frankly political/ideological considerations.10  In this short essay, I will 
look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as they relate to two specific 
issues and attempt to discern what image of a lawyer the rules project and the 
ethical constraints they entail.  The issues I will discuss relate to a lawyer’s 
independence and the confidentiality of information relating to the 
representation of clients.  Section I takes up the issue of independence.  Section 
II then turns to issues of confidentiality and the circumstances in and means by 
which a lawyer may, on ethical grounds, choose to distance himself or herself 
from a client because of the social consequences of the client’s behavior.  I will 
then conclude with some suggestions for reforming the Model Rules’ extreme 
limits on the lawyer’s ability to “blow the whistle” on the environmental 
practices of clients that threaten harm to third parties. 
I.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYER AS TRUSTED AND LOYAL ADVOCATE AND 
AS AN AGENT OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT 
The reigning ideal of legal practice is summed up in ideas of 
“professionalism” and the importance of recognizing special ethical rules that 
depart from “ordinary ethics” in differentiating the unique role of lawyers from 
that of others.11  The idea of “professional ethics,” then, suggests that there are 
courses of conduct for lawyers that are governed by different standards than 
those applicable to the same conduct engaged in by others.  Or as, Richard 
Wasserstrom says, “it is the nature of role-differentiated behavior that it often 
makes it both appropriate and desirable for the person in a particular role to put 
to one side considerations of various sorts—and especially various moral 
considerations—that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive.”12 
While agreement on what professionalism means or requires may be 
difficult to obtain, it has been suggested that at the very least the ideal 
“presupposes a substantial degree of public commitment and private 
autonomy.”13  Despite the occasional argument that lawyers should 
 
 10. For an extensive exploration of these issues, see Gordon, supra note 6. 
 11. On “role-differentiated” ethics and the legal profession, see THE ETHICS OF LAWYERS 
xii-xiv (David Luban, ed. 1994); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral 
Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).  See also A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980) (dealing with role-differentiated ethics in general). 
 12. Wasserstrom, supra note 11. 
 13. Rhode, supra note 4, at 592. 
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hardheadedly treat their “business as a business” informed by the “morals of 
the marketplace,”14 most lawyers, at least in their more reflective moments, 
think of their work as aspiring to the requirements of justice and as a distinctly 
public spirited undertaking.15 
Given the realities of today’s marketplace and the manner in which the 
practice of law often is structured, the “public spirited” aspects of 
professionalism may as a practical matter be very hard to live up to.  There are, 
however, things that the bar can and has done to promote the objectives of 
professionalism.  Among them is the development and enforcement of 
professional rules of conduct.  These rules express the collective judgment of 
the bar concerning the ethical role of the lawyer and the limits within which a 
lawyer’s discretion may be exercised.  Ethical rules, representing norms to 
which lawyers presumably are committed, might be viewed as setting forth the 
necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for promoting the ideal of the 
professional.  The rules project into the community the aspirations that lawyers 
assign to their social roles and also alert clients to the kinds of services they 
can and cannot reasonably expect lawyers to perform on their behalf.16  
Moreover, at least in some cases, the “law” articulated in the rules of 
professional conduct may strongly influence the “law” applied by courts and 
other state officials, most of whom are themselves lawyers.17 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct articulate the ethical dimensions 
of lawyering from the perspective of the American Bar Association.  They 
explicitly endorse the idea of a lawyer as an independent moral agent.  Thus, in 
Rule 1.2(b) “[a] lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an 
endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or 
 
 14. King, The Law Gets Down to Business, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 1983, at 37, quoted in 
Rhode, supra note 4, at 593. 
 15. Morris Harrell, Preserving Professionalism, 69 A.B.A.J. 864 (1983). 
 16. For some provocative thoughts about the connection between the bar’s ethical codes and 
public perceptions of lawyers, see Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913 
(1990). 
 17. For an exploration of ethical rules and state rules as competing systems of “law” and 
how these systems interrelate, see the marvelous article by Susan Koniak, The Law Between the 
Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992).  Perhaps the most dramatic example of the 
manner in which codes of professional ethics may impact state law is Tarasoff v. Regents of 
University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), in which the California Supreme Court 
imposed a tort duty on psychotherapists to disclose a patient’s intention to cause harm to a third 
party, in part by noting that such disclosure is “not a breach of trust or a violation of professional 
ethics as stated in the PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION (1957) section 9: ‘A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in 
the course of medical attendance . . . unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes 
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.’”  Id. at 441-42 
(emphasis added). 
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activities.”18  More pertinently, Rule 2.1 provides:  “In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid 
advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may 
be relevant to the client’s situation.”19 
The commentary to this rule expresses what all lawyers know to be largely 
true: 
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, 
especially where practical considerations, such as costs or effects on other 
people, are predominant.  Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can 
sometimes be inadequate.  It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral 
and ethical considerations in giving advice.  Although a lawyer is not a moral 
advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal 
questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.20 
One of the interesting things about environmental lawyers that I have 
noticed personally is that they seem to align their conceptions of what morality 
or the public interest requires with the interests of their clients.  There may be 
deep psychological reasons for this alignment,21 but it does suggest that there 
are real difficulties facing lawyers who do desire to bring some measure of 
independent judgment in the form of a sense of the community’s moral or 
political commitments earnestly to bear on the advice he or she imparts to 
clients.  It seems obvious to me that independence requires considerable 
reflection and courage, and sometimes it may entail a willingness to say to 
your client things that he or she may frankly prefer not to hear or even think 
about.  Independence may even be costly both in terms of relations with clients 
and peers and the lawyer’s ability to generate business.  These thoughts are 
mere speculation, reflective only of my rather limited experience in 
environmental practice. 
 
 18. Consider also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.2(c) (1995): “A 
lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.” 
 19. Id. at Rule 2.1. 
 20. Id. at Rule 2.1 cmt. 
 21. See Deborah Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 665, 686 
(1994): 
Individuals are more likely to retain information that reflects favorably on themselves and 
to form positive impressions of someone on whom their own success partly depends.  So 
too, the very act of advocating a particular position increases the likelihood that 
proponents will themselves come to adopt that position.  In many practice settings, these 
cognitive biases, together with financial self-interest, collegial pressure, and diffusion of 
responsibility inevitably skew ethical judgment.  Such distortions can affect lawyers’ 
sense of collective as well as personal responsibility.  The more closely that individuals 
identify with their professional role, the less sensitive they may become to problems in its 
normative foundations or practical consequences. 
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To explore how independence may bear practically on environmental law, 
consider the following hypothetical: manufacturing concern XYZ has recently 
redesigned its production process to achieve greater efficiencies.  Management 
informs you that the modifications are “minor” and may not even be noticeable 
to an otherwise informed observer (read: environmental enforcement 
agencies).  One result of these design changes is the generation of a waste 
product, call it “strange stuff.”  Management insists that strange stuff is 
“almost identical” to a waste product generated by the firm’s old processes and 
that nothing in the process changes should render the strange stuff any more 
harmful than the old waste. 
The old waste product was not a “listed” hazardous waste under EPA 
regulations promulgated pursuant to Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA).22  Nor did the old waste display hazardous 
characteristics when it was subjected to extensive testing by XYZ.23  Thus, the 
old waste was not subject to the stringent requirements of RCRA Subtitle C.24  
Management of XYZ asks you whether it is required to treat the strange stuff 
any differently than it treated the old waste. 
The “narrowly legal response” may go something like this.  You inform 
the client that if the waste is not listed as hazardous in EPA’s regulations, it is 
the responsibility of XYZ to determine whether the waste is subject to Subtitle 
C requirements.25 (Suppose here that it is not a listed waste.)  You then 
describe the approved methods for making that determination, one of which is 
to allow the client to rely on its “knowledge of the hazard characteristic of the 
waste in light of the materials or the processes used.”26  The client then asks, 
“Well, because the new stuff is almost identical to the old stuff and because the 
process changes were minor, we can rely on our knowledge of the old stuff to 
conclude strange stuff isn’t hazardous, right?” 
 
 22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 – 6992k (1994).  Section 6921(b)(1) directs EPA to “promulgate 
regulations identifying the characteristics of hazardous wastes, and listing particular wastes . . ., 
which shall be subject” to regulation under RCRA.  Id. at § 6921(b)(1) (1994).  EPA’s regulations 
listing hazardous wastes are found at 40 C.F.R. Part 261, Subpart D (1999). 
 23. Characteristics of wastes that will be deemed to render the waste “hazardous” are set 
forth in 40 C.F.R. Part 261, Subpart C (1999).  The characteristics include: ignitability, id. at 
§ 261.21; corrosivity, id. § 261.22; reactivity, id. § 261.23; and toxicity, id. § 261.24.  Under EPA 
regulations, for wastes that are not specifically listed as hazardous wastes in EPA regulations, the 
generator of that waste must determine if it is hazardous by virtue of its characteristics by either 
testing the waste according to EPA-approved testing procedures or “[a]pplying knowledge in 
light of the materials or the processes used.”  Id. § 262.11(c)(2) (1999). 
 24. Subtitle C imposes a variety of requirements on persons who handle or otherwise 
manage hazardous wastes, including generators, see 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1994); transporters, see id. 
§ 6923; and those who store, treat, or dispose of hazardous wastes.  See id. §§ 6924-6925. 
 25. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.11(c) (1999). 
 26. Id. § 262.11(c)(2). 
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What does independent judgment informed by political, economic, social 
and political factors require in this situation?  Rule 1.2 forbids lawyers to 
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows 
is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of 
any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client 
to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law. 
This Rule is not particularly helpful here, because you really don’t “know” one 
way or the other whether the strange stuff is hazardous. 
Should you advise your client to investigate and provide more details about 
the modifications?  This example puts the “independence” issue under at least 
some pressure.  If, as part of what it means to be a professional, a lawyer 
should think of himself not only as a “representative of clients,” but also as “an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for 
the quality of justice,”27 he may, in the course of providing advice to a client be 
inclined to engage in what Professor Robert Gordon calls “purposive 
lawyering.”28 
A lawyer adopting the purposive perspective would strive to maintain the 
spirit of the laws both inside and outside the context of representation, to assist 
in carrying out their “essential purposes” or “social functions,” or at least to 
refrain from acting so as to subvert and nullify the purposes of the rules.29  
Such an approach might emphasize the integral role played by regulated parties 
in achieving the objectives of environmental law in general and RCRA in 
particular.  It might suggest that XYZ ought not try to use the “knowledge” test 
for hazardousness in a paradoxical way that shields itself of the knowledge of 
whether in fact strange stuff is hazardous.  A “good faith” approach to the 
problem might argue powerfully in favor of advising XYZ to conduct the 
appropriate tests on the strange stuff and to manage the waste in accordance 
with the results of such testing. 
On the other hand, the generations of lawyers weaned on legal realism and 
the advocacy model may view the idea of purposive lawyering as a lot of pious 
romanticism, completely at odds with the intense extant competition both in 
the business and legal worlds.  Or they may insist that “purpose” is in the eye 
of the beholder and disclaim any special expertise in discovering the truly 
“public regarding” purposes of the rules.  They may even seize upon the 
skeptical claim that the idea of a “public interest” behind most environmental 
laws is nothing but an illusion, and indeed, defensively add that most 
regulations make no sense and do nothing to really protect the environment or 
public health.  They may recall Justice Holmes’ admonition: 
 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities. 
 28. Gordon, supra note 6, at 23. 
 29. Id. (citations omitted). 
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If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, 
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables 
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience. . . . 
[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not 
care two straws for the axioms and deductions, but he does want to know what 
the . . . courts are likely to do.30 
On this view, and providing that the lawyer believes that the client can make at 
least a plausible claim that its experience with the old waste would support 
resort to the “knowledge” test for hazardousness, it may be well to advise the 
client that the less it really knows about strange stuff the better off they may be 
legally.  Additionally, the suggestion in Rule 1.2 that “a lawyer may discuss 
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct”—a phrase 
curiously placed after an admonition forbidding the lawyer to counsel 
fraudulent or criminal conduct and introduced by the word “but”—would seem 
to permit lawyers to advise the client frankly of the possibility of getting 
caught even if the strange stuff were later determined to be hazardous—a kind 
of “risk assessment.”  I suppose this would be advice that takes into account 
“social” and “political” factors, i.e., the kind of advice the Rules encourage 
lawyers to provide.  Would it be “ethical” to advise the client that he may 
basically do as he pleases with the waste, given his “knowledge” claim and the 
low risks of enforcement action?31  What exactly are the “legal aspects” of the 
conduct in the hypothetical?  Your answer may depend critically on whether 
you see the world through the lenses of a purposive lawyer or a realist.  Would 
it matter that your experience with the client convinces you that the client is 
ready, willing and, eager to exploit any and all “loopholes” in environmental 
enforcement?  A slightly different question is this:  as a zealous advocate of the 
client’s interests, are you ethically required  to provide this advice?  And if you 
don’t so advise the client, but instead urge it to “do the right thing” and test the 
waste, isn’t it likely that XYZ will seek a more “realistic” or “hardnosed” 
assessment of the actual consequences of alternative courses of action from 
your legal competition who, we may assume, is all too willing to supply it? 
I raise these issues not because I can confidently provide “right” answers 
to them.  Nor, as an academic, can I confidently suppose that issues like these 
 
 30. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-460 (1897). 
 31. Consider Model Rule 1.2, Comment 6: 
  A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual consequences that 
appear likely to result from a client’s conduct.  The fact that a client uses advice in a 
course of action that is criminal or fraudulent does not, of itself, make a lawyer a party to 
the course of action.  However, a lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in criminal or 
fraudulent conduct.  There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal 
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud 
might be committed with impunity. 
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are commonly encountered in the environmental lawyer’s everyday practice.  
But it might be important to take a somewhat larger, societal view of this sort 
of practice.  In that respect, I would like to advance several reasons that favor 
the “purposive lawyering” approach. 
First, it is not at all clear that clients want their attorneys to advise them 
solely of the ways in which they can exploit vagaries and loopholes in 
environmental law.  Many clients are acutely concerned with their public 
image; they may be desirous of projecting an image of good corporate 
citizenship, particularly with respect to environmental compliance.  Indeed, 
many clients may come to value their lawyer’s “public-interested” political and 
moral judgments, seeking to cast the lawyer in the role of a kind of corporate 
conscience, who brings to the table a discussion of public values that might 
otherwise never make an appearance.32  Unless we are to believe the cynical 
view that industry is more interested in marketing a good citizenship image 
than it is in living up to what that image requires, purposive lawyering may be 
viewed as valuable corporate service. 
Second, like many other areas of practice, the success of our environmental 
laws is radically dependent on clients’ good faith efforts to comply with the 
myriad of reporting and disclosure requirements mandated by those laws, as 
well as candid disclosure of information that is largely unavailable to 
regulators from other sources.33  Clients’ willingness to engage in such good 
faith efforts to fulfill these responsibilities is, I suspect, a function of what 
might be called the reigning “compliance culture” and, of course, economic 
pressures.  If lawyers are instrumental in creating the kind of compliance 
culture that obtains in the field—a supposition in which I can express no real 
confidence—the bar on the whole might well be advised to admonish lawyers 
consistently to use their skills to encourage clients to do the “right thing.” 
This amounts roughly to the claim that the kind of advice lawyers give to 
their clients becomes a kind of unofficial “law” that clients will come to 
understand and in accordance with they will conform their conduct.  To the 
extent that this unofficial law departs markedly from the more visible, public 
understanding of environmental law, lawyers can justifiably be charged with 
subverting the public interest or arrogating to themselves and their clients the 
power to decide what good environmental management or the “law” entails.  I 
see great dangers for the profession in the creation and promotion of this kind 
of underground law or “compliance culture,” not the least of which is, as 
 
 32. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 25. 
 33. A persistent criticism of industry in the environmental law context is its apparent 
willingness to present exaggerated data to regulators in an effort to water down regulatory 
requirements.  See, e.g., Rosenberg, Clean Air Amendments, 251 SCIENCE 1546, 1547 (1991) 
(describing grossly inflated industry estimates of the costs of compliance with EPA’s phaseout of 
lead in gasoline).  I suspect, but do not know, that lawyers play an important role in fashioning 
such exaggerations. 
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suggested in the introduction, greater public distrust and the possibility of state 
regulation.  Moreover, the substantive effect on those clients who do desire to 
engage in good faith compliance efforts may be severe demoralization.  
Indeed, if candid advice consistently includes discussion of the ways in which 
loopholes can be exploited, and that advice is coupled with an ideology that 
regards regulation adversarially as nothing more than official oppression 
designed to curtail the client’s “liberty,” the result may be a kind of “prisoners’ 
dilemma.”  Even those clients that earnestly desire to do the “right thing” may 
find themselves suffering significant economic disadvantages relative to 
competitors who choose to play “hardball.”  In these circumstances, good faith 
compliance may not only be economically irrational, but perhaps morally 
supererogatory as well.34 
Finally, a view of lawyering that seeks to advance the client’s interests by 
exploiting “any gap, ambiguity, technicality, or loophole, any not-so-
obviously-and-totally-implausible interpretation of the law or facts”35 may not 
only sabotage the public-regarding functioning of our environmental laws and 
demoralize public spirited clients, but in a legal culture that tends toward this 
view of its professional role may ultimately frustrate the purposes of their 
clients and will surely erode lawyers’ confidence that they are, in fact, 
participating in a “noble profession.”  With respect to clients’ interests, an 
environmental regime that consistently fails to deliver on its explicit and 
implicit promises because of a culture of noncompliance among regulated 
parties is an open invitation for public demands for more draconian 
governmental responses. 
II.  PUTTING INDEPENDENCE TO THE TEST:  “BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON 
CLIENT MISCONDUCT THAT THREATENS THIRD PARTIES” 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of legal ethics as currently practiced 
in many jurisdictions is the rather extreme restrictions placed on a lawyer’s 
ability to disclose information relating to the representation of a client, 
regardless of the social consequences of nondisclosure.  Confidentiality is a 
“constitutional norm” in the bar’s normative world, 
so central to [lawyer’s conception of their role] that the [bar] perceives threats 
to the norm as threats against the [bar] itself—against the [bar’s] very 
 
 34. Gordon, supra note 6, at 20-21: 
  If clients, including those who prefer to be law-abiding even when nobody is likely 
to know when they are not, habitually consult lawyers who recommend only the most 
literal forms of compliance and widen every loophole far enough to drive a truck through, 
the lawyers will end up effectively frustrating the purposes of their clients as well as legal 
rules.  The lawyer under such an ethical regime is by vocation someone who helps clients 
find ways around the law. 
 35. Id. at 20. 
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existence; that the [bar] sees proposals to change the norm as proposals to 
change the essence/character/ function of the [bar] itself; and consequently the 
[bar] feels extreme action in defense of the norm is justified.36 
One example of what might arguably be regarded as “extreme action in 
defense of the norm”37 is Model Rule 1.6.  The rule provides: 
Confidentiality of Information 
(a) A Lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation 
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for 
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b). 
(b)  A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily 
harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and client, to establish a defense to a 
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.38 
How “extreme” do you think this rule is?  Consider Sissela Bok’s reaction 
to it: 
The . . . Rule was bound to add to existing distrust of lawyers.  Arguably, the 
collective exemptions granted by the Rule put lawyers in league not only with 
countless disparate crimes, but with conspiracies of a magnitude that make 
bank robberies look like petty theft by comparison.  Critics regard as bizarre 
the Rule’s delineation of only one circumstance under which lawyers may 
violate confidentiality about crimes planned by their clients: when disclosure is 
necessary to “prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer 
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. . . .”  
These critics saw as equally bizarre the phrasing of the Rule’s exception so as 
to merely permit, but not require, lawyers to disclose such plans of 
wrongdoing. 
  Confronted with such a narrow interpretation of a lawyer’s responsibility, 
commentators both inside and outside the legal profession might ask: what 
about a duty to report criminal plans in cases where the victims will not 
 
 36. Koniak, supra note 17, at 1427. 
 37. Id. 
 38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.6 (1995). 
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otherwise be warned in time?  What about criminal conduct likely to result in 
deaths that are not “imminent”? . . . . 
  Such questions will hardly be deflected by the unsubstantiated and 
counterintuitive claims made in the comment to Model Rule 1.6: 
  Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine 
what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed 
to be legal and correct. . . . 
  Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the 
advice given, and the law is upheld. 
  Rhetoric of this kind merely reinforces the critics’ distrust.  They see it as 
further evidence that lawyers guard their prerogatives, not to uphold the noble 
goals they claim for their profession, but simply to protect themselves and 
camouflage abuses from which they benefit.39 
We might want to test the extremity of the Rule by applying it in an 
environmental practice setting.  Let’s return to my hypothetical about the 
strange stuff waste.  Suppose management has directed that the waste be 
dumped in a surface impoundment located on XYZ property.  A year later, and 
after continuous dumping, management decides to sell off this parcel of 
property.  It covers and re-seeds the impoundment before offering the parcel 
for sale.  In negotiations with a prospective buyer your client is specifically 
asked by the buyer if any hazardous wastes have ever been disposed of on the 
parcel.  Your client assures the buyer no such disposal has occurred.  Are you 
obligated, or even permitted, to disclose the existence of the strange stuff? 
Rule 4.1, titled “Truthfulness with Persons Other than Clients,” provides: 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
  (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or 
  (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless 
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.40 
Can you relieve yourself of any compunctions about your client’s 
statement by assuring yourself that you don’t “know” if the client’s statement 
is, in fact, materially misleading because it fails to disclose a fact that you 
think the buyer might be interested in knowing?  Of course, you don’t know 
whether the client’s dumping of the strange stuff will cause imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm.  It seems clear that in this situation Rule 1.6 precludes 
disclosure. 
 
 39. Bok, supra note 16, at 915-16 (citations omitted). 
 40. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4.1 (1995). 
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Nonetheless you begin to worry about the possibility of a claim of 
negligent misrepresentation (or worse)41 should the strange stuff later be 
discovered to be hazardous or cause some environmental problems.42  What 
should you do? 
Suppose you conclude that due diligence requires that you ask an 
independent environmental analyst to examine some of the strange stuff, but 
you do not inform your client of your intention to do this.  The analyst 
performs the appropriate tests and then confirms your worst fears: strange stuff 
is highly toxic and laced with heavy concentrations of a potent carcinogen.  
Are you now obligated to disclose this information to the buyer?  Would Rule 
4.1 be “trumped” by Rule 1.6 here, assuming that under Rule 1.6 you can come 
to no reasonable judgment about whether disclosure is necessary to prevent 
“imminent death or substantial bodily injury”?  Suppose further that you had 
previously given the buyer a copy of an environmental audit of the parcel, 
which you personally supervised and signed, and which attested to the absence 
of any hazardous waste? 
You are sufficiently concerned at this point that you attempt to confront 
the client with the information you have discovered.  You open the 
conversation with the comment, “I had some toxicity tests performed on the 
strange stuff,” but you are interrupted by your client, who asks, “Who did the 
tests?”  Upon learning that the tests were conducted by an independent analyst, 
your client responds with a wink, “I don’t know anything about any tests, 
right?” and insists that she must hurry off to a meeting.43 
Your options may be quite limited here.  First, it is useful to clarify that 
Model Rule 1.6’s protection is not limited to client communications or even 
information learned in the course of the representation.  There is simply no 
correspondence between Model Rule 1.6 and the attorney-client privilege.44  
The information you have obtained would be considered to be “relating to 
representation” and thus within the scope of Rule 1.6’s nondisclosure rule.  
Comment 5 to Rule 1.6 (ABA) states that “[t]he confidentiality rule applies not 
 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1994) (imposing criminal liability for failure to notify 
appropriate authorities of the release of reportable quantities of hazardous substances). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
953 (1964). 
 43. As suggested by the excerpt from Sissela Bok in the text, supra note 39 and text 
accompanying, much of the rationale for Model Rule 1.6 rests on the idea that lawyers have the 
power to persuade their clients to do the right thing. I have no way of knowing if this assumption 
can be empirically verified.  Commentators have been fairly critical of the assumption.  See, e.g., 
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 4, at 615; Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: 
Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1166-67 (1985).  
Moreover, it does not explain why it is appropriate to treat disclosure as misconduct in those 
cases in which, despite the lawyers advice, the client persists in conscious wrongdoing.  Id. at 
1167. 
 44. Id. at 1106-59. 
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merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all 
information relating to the representation, whatever its source.”45  Disclosure 
of this information would then be improper under Rule 1.6.  ABA Formal 
Opinion 92-366 specifically concludes that a lawyer may not reveal a client’s 
fraud, even if that fraud is furthered by the client’s presentation of an attorney 
opinion letter that the attorney and the client later learn to be false.  Opinion 
92-366 states that  “[a]ny argument that Rule 4.1(a) . . . applies in this situation 
fails in the face of the fact that the lawyer did not know at the time she 
[rendered the opinion] that [it was] false.”46 
Nonetheless, the possibility that this transaction will be completed on the 
existing terms troubles you.  Here is one possible avenue for “disclosure.”  
Rule 1.16(a) requires an attorney to withdraw from the representation if it “will 
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law.”47  In 
Formal Opinion 92-366, the ABA concluded that in circumstances roughly 
analogous to those in my hypothetical, a lawyer is required to withdraw, 
because continued representation would violate Rule 1.2(d), viz. assisting a 
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be fraudulent.48  Moreover, relying 
on Model Rule 1.6, comment 16,49 Formal Opinion 92-366 concluded that a 
lawyer “may disaffirm documents prepared in the course of the representation 
that are being, or will be, used in furtherance of the fraud, even though such a 
‘noisy’ withdrawal may have the collateral effect of inferentially revealing 
client confidences.”50 
The “noisy withdrawal” option seems to allow the lawyer to do what Rule 
1.6 would otherwise forbid.51  As Professor Geoffrey Hazard has noted: 
“Giving a signal—going through a ritual that is intended to be a signal and is 
understood as a signal—is surely to ‘reveal’ the information that the signal 
denotes.”52  It is not at all clear why the bar chose this “nondisclosure” form of 
disclosure, except perhaps to emphasize the strength of the bar’s commitment 
to the confidentiality norm in form if not in fact.  It may very well be that the 
noisy withdrawal option is designed for defensive purposes, to protect lawyers 
from civil and criminal exposure while at least preserving formal notions of 
 
 45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.6 (1995). 
 46. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). 
 47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.16(a) (1995). 
 48. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). 
 49. That comment provides: 
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the clients’ 
confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6.  Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) 
nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the 
lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. 
 50. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). 
 51. Koniak, supra note 17, at 1446. 
 52. Id. (quoting Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a 
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 304 (1984)). 
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confidentiality.53  Moreover, the fact that the “noisy withdrawal” option is 
relegated to a footnote may be a signal that it should be employed only 
sparingly.54  “After all, the lawyer who acts upon a comment does so at some 
risk because, according to the Model Rules, ‘[c]omments are intended as 
guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.’”55  But as 
Opinion 92-366 makes clear, even the “nondisclosure-disclosure” in the form 
of a noisy withdrawal is not mandatory.56  Does this give some credence to the 
charge that Rule 1.6 allows exemptions that “put lawyers in league” with 
crooks?  What aspects of the lawyer’s professional role demand such a 
restrictive disclosure policy? 
Suppose that instead of hurrying off to a meeting, your client tells you that 
he has decided to have another firm handle the real estate transaction, and that 
you are relieved of any further responsibility in the matter.  Can you disclose 
the test results to the new firm or may you expressly disavow the 
environmental audit?  In Opinion 92-366, the ABA stated: 
[T]he lawyer’s ability to disaffirm work product, and thus attempt to 
disassociate herself from further client fraud based upon that work product, 
cannot depend upon whether the client or the lawyer is the first to act in 
discontinuing the representation.  The possibility of a noisy withdrawal cannot 
be preempted by a swift dismissal of the lawyer by the client.57 
Extending the hypothetical, suppose that you decide to withdraw but 
decline to do so “noisily.” (Remember that the “noisy” part of the withdrawal 
is subject to the lawyer’s discretion, even if the withdrawal itself is not, 
although on these facts it seems hard to justify not taking this course of action.)  
The client then refuses to pay you for the services you had rendered prior to 
withdrawal.  May you disclose the circumstances surrounding your withdrawal 
in an effort to collect your fee?  To the extent that such disclosures may assist 
you in defending the client’s purported justification for refusing to pay, Rule 
1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure.58  Does this strike you as a defensible set of 
rules—i.e., rules that allow disclosure to protect your fees but not the financial 
interests of others?  How is the public likely to perceive the difference in 
disclosure options available to a lawyer depending on whether it is the 
 
 53. This is the suggestion made in Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The 
Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/ LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 95, 132-33 
(Robert Nelson et al., eds. 1992). 
 54. It is worth noting in this connection, that Opinion 92-366 expressly limits the option of a 
“noisy withdrawal” to circumstances in which withdrawal is mandatory under Rule 1.16. 
 55. Koniak, supra note 17, at 1446 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 
scope). 
 56. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). 
 57. Id. 
 58. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1995). 
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lawyer’s or an innocent third party’s interests that are at risk from 
nondisclosure?59 
Playing with the hypothetical a little more, assume that the deal goes 
through, then the buyer immediately announces its intention to develop the 
property for residential purposes.  Part of the plan is to use the aquifer under 
the property to supply the residential community with drinking water.  May 
you disclose under these circumstances?  This is where the obligations of 
environmental lawyers as set forth in the Model Rules may become somewhat 
difficult to accept as a standard of “ethical” conduct.  Suppose you are certain 
that the strange stuff will leach into the aquifer, even though current tests show 
no contamination.  Would Rule 1.6(b)’s exception for conduct be likely to 
cause imminent death or substantial bodily injury permit disclosure?  And to 
make things even more tricky, suppose that your parents have purchased a lot 
in this development and plan to construct their retirement dream home on it? 
Rule 1.6 appears to prohibit disclosure.  It is only in situations where harm 
is reasonably believed by the lawyer to be the likely result of a client’s 
intention to commit a criminal act, rather than the effect of a past criminal act, 
that disclosure is permissible.60  Comment 12 to Rule 1.6 makes clear that the 
exceptions provided in subsection (b) apply only to “prospective conduct” by 
the client, not to conduct on the part of others or to a client’s past criminal 
acts.61  In the hypothetical, it is likely that the client’s conduct will be viewed 
as completed, past conduct, and thus outside the permissive disclosure 
provision of 1.6(b).  Similarly, the absence of any reason to believe that death 
will be “imminently” caused by the development activities would limit your 
disclosure options even if a case could be made that your client’s conduct is 
both criminal and ongoing. 
To complete the picture painted by the Model Rules’ view of an attorney’s 
obligation to disclose information in furtherance of the public interest, consider 
another variation on my hypothetical.  Suppose that the place at which the 
strange stuff was disposed of is a permitted solid waste management facility 
under RCRA.  XYZ has been in negotiations with the state concerning 
corrective action obligations at the site.  Those obligations are then finalized, 
but do not include any reference to the strange stuff or the impoundment in 
which it has been disposed, largely because the state accepted the conclusions 
of the environmental audit that you were instrumental in fashioning.  Only 
 
 59. Professor Harry Subin is quite critical of Rule 1.6 in this respect: “[I]t is ethically 
inappropriate for the Model Rules to protect attorneys from wrongful actions of the client while 
protecting no one else—except, of course, the prospective victims of that commonly encountered 
client, the homicidal maniac.”  Subin, supra note 43, at 1154. 
 60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.6 (1995). 
 61. Id. at cmt. 12. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1080 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1061 
after agreement with the state has been reached do you discover that strange 
stuff is, in fact, really hazardous stuff. 
Rule 3.3, entitled “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary 
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
*  *  * 
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer has 
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall 
take reasonable remedial measures. 
(b)  The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the 
proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.62 
The comments to and the text of Rule 3.3 make clear that any conflict 
between the nondisclosure obligations of Rule 1.6 and the lawyer’s duty of 
candor to a tribunal are to be resolved in favor of the latter obligation.  
Nevertheless, there are some interesting questions that make this conclusion 
somewhat difficult on the facts here supposed.  First, is the state a “tribunal” 
for purposes of Rule 3.3?  Assuming that it is (a conclusion in which I can 
express no real confidence) would disclosure be required?  To answer that 
question we would have to determine whether the “proceeding” has been 
completed.  As subsection (b) of Rule 3.3 makes clear, Rule 3.3 trumps Rule 
1.6 only in the context of an ongoing proceeding.  If, after the conclusion of 
the proceeding, a lawyer learns that the information upon which a “tribunal” 
relied is false, the priority of the conflicting rules shifts and Rule 1.6 seems to 
forbid disclosure.  Comment 13 (ABA) explains this somewhat counter-
intuitive requirement by an appeal to the need to place some time limit on Rule 
3.3’s disclosure obligation: “[a] practical time limit on the obligation to rectify 
the presentation of false evidence has to be established.  The conclusion of the 
proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the 
obligation.”63 
To the extent that the failure to disclose might be regarded as assisting a 
client in a continuing course of fraudulent or criminal conduct, Rule 1.2 and 
Rule 1.16, together with Formal Opinion 92-366, may require withdrawal and 
the possibility of making it a “noisy” one.  This conclusion itself is, however, 
 
 62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.3 (1995). 
 63. Id. at cmt. 13. 
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not without difficulty.  In Opinion 92-366, as mentioned above, it was plainly 
stated that a noisy withdrawal is permissible only where withdrawal is 
otherwise mandatory under Rule 1.16.64  The opinion also states “that 
disaffirmance is not allowed where the fraud is completed, and the client does 
not, so far as the lawyer knows or reasonably believes, intend to make further 
fraudulent use of the lawyer’s services” (emphasis added).65  On the 
hypothetical facts, can the lawyer safely conclude that the client is making 
“further” fraudulent use of the lawyer’s services, even if there is no further 
affirmative use of the audit?  Again, I have no real confidence on how this 
issue would be resolved. 
CONCLUSION 
I began this essay by drawing attention to some criticisms that have been 
leveled against lawyers and the apparent diminution in public trust of the 
profession.  It would be a gross oversimplification to conclude that the bar’s 
official conception of a lawyer’s ethical responsibilities, as set forth in the 
Model Rules, were the primary cause of these problems.  But, as I hope this 
essay makes clear, the espoused ideals of professional independence run into 
serious conflicts when the Model Rule’s rather extreme prohibitions on 
disclosing matters relating to the representation of a client are examined. 
Part of the problem may not be that the ethics applicable to legal practice 
should not be differentiated from the requirements of “ordinary ethics” due to 
the role lawyers play in our community.  It may be that the idea of a single 
role—and particular, the role of an “advocate”—is simply not discriminating 
enough to deal adequately with the varied responsibilities lawyers undertake in 
today’s legal system.  It may, therefore, be appropriate for the bar to consider 
whether it makes sense to recognize a multiplicity of roles for lawyers and to 
do some critical thinking about whether the appropriate ethical requirements 
may vary depending upon the “role” in which the lawyer is actually engaged.  
There may indeed be appropriate circumstances in which the extreme 
confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.6 become not only ethically dubious but 
also counterproductive.  Firm conclusions on this matter are difficult, given the 
relative paucity of information on how changes to Model Rule 1.6 would 
actually affect the practice of law.66  One of the more interesting results of a 
 
 64. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). 
 65. Id. 
 66. For a fairly recent empirical study of how a mandatory disclosure rule operates in 
practice, see Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to 
Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81 (1994).  The article examines 
lawyer’s responses to New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1), which provides: 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client 
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survey of lawyers’ responses was that 60.3% of the lawyers surveyed 
supported disclosure requirements to prevent crimes involving substantial 
harm to the environment.67  Nonetheless, it may be time to drop the illusion of 
a single “role” for lawyers and to begin the hard work of determining whether 
our current ethical requirements accurately and appropriately project the kind 
of image we as lawyers want to impress onto the larger community. 
 
 
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of another. 
 67. See Levin, supra note 66, at 134. 
